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 NAMING AND BLAMING: THE CASE OF
 "THE REHNQUIST COURT"
 Edward A. Purcell, Jr.
 Nancy Maveety. Queen's Court: Judicial Power in the Rehnquist Era. Lawrence:
 University of Kansas Press, 2008. ix + 194 pp. Notes, bibliography, and index.
 $29.95.
 Using the names of chief justices to demarcate periods in the history of the
 United States Supreme Court is as common as it is misleading. The label "War-
 ren Court" seems etched in stone, for example, even though the Court went
 through two, if not three, quite distinct phases between 1953 and 1969 when
 the eponymous Earl Warren was chief. The last phase, moreover, arguably
 continued for almost a decade after Warren left the bench, and might - at least
 after the early 1960s - have more accurately been termed the "Brennan Court."
 Applying the chief justice's name to the recently terminated "Rehnquist Court"
 is particularly inapt, Professor Nancy Maveety argues in her new book, Queen's
 Court, a title that readily captures her thesis. Seeking "to assign a definitive
 meaning to the 'Rehnquist Court'" and "identify its historical importance,"
 Maveety concludes that the Court under Chief Justice William Rehnquist
 "should be remembered legitimately as Justice O'Connor's." Both its long-
 term significance and the "real difficulties - jurisprudential and systemic"
 that it created - flowed from the "judicial O'Connorism" that characterized
 its work (p. 4).
 A specialist in the Court's history and the author of Justice Sandra Day
 O'Connor: Strategist on the Supreme Court (1996), Maveety is well positioned
 to evaluate the contributions of the Court's first female member during her
 twenty-five-year tenure from 1981 to 2006. Few, of course, would dispute the
 author's general premise that O'Connor "sat, figuratively if not literally," at
 the center of the Rehnquist Court (p. 4). Indeed, her pivotal role has long been
 recognized. Edward Lazarus, who clerked for Justice Harry Blackmun in the late
 1980s, concluded a decade later that the Court "remains, as it was in my day,
 a creature of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy." The two "swing" conservatives
 controlled. "In case after case," Lazarus explained, "these swing-vote justices
 write separate concurrences, usually modulating the conservative insurgency,
 Reviews in American History 37 (2009) 440-445 © 2009 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
This content downloaded from 208.67.210.24 on Wed, 05 Dec 2018 15:06:40 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PURCELL / The Case of "The Rehnquist Court" 441
 but always bending the Court and the law to their will."1 Subsequently, sur-
 veying O'Connor's tenure after her retirement, Jeffrey Toobin portrayed her
 position similarly if more dramatically. "The way to win a majority in the
 Rehnquist Court was to earn O'Connor's support," he wrote, "so her colleagues
 invariably came to her as supplicants."2 Thus, the importance of Maveety's
 book lies neither in its identification of O'Connor's pivotal position on the
 Rehnquist Court nor in its description of her "as a centrist conservative on a
 sharply divided and jurisprudentially polarized Supreme Court" (p. 3). Rather,
 its importance lies in its more specific argument that O'Connor used her key
 position not just to swing cases her way but also to reshape the Court's inner
 workings. Largely assuming, rather than examining, issues of political context,
 judicial values, and substantive doctrine, Maveety concentrates on the Court's
 evolving institutional norms and defacto decision-making process, and it is in
 those areas that she locates O'Connor's principal significance. O'Connor was
 "the crucial contributor to each of the several legacies of the Supreme Court
 during the Rehnquist era" she concludes, and the Rehnquist Court's primary
 legacy was its normative and behavioral acceptance of a distinctive "judicial
 O'Connorism" (p. 4, italics in original).
 Queen's Court builds its argument in a series of steps. Chapter one, based
 largely on the papers of Justice Harry Blackmun covering three early terms
 (1986, 1991, and 1993), argues that "individuated judicial behavior defined the
 Rehnquist Court" (p. 5). The chief ran a "nondeliberative conference" (p. 14)
 that fostered a norm of "judicial individualism" (p. 35) as well as a practice
 of informal bargaining in which the justices strove to pull together majority
 coalitions to support specific results in individual cases. "O'Connor and her
 colleagues," Maveety explains, "behaved as if the circulation of conditional join
 memos and concurrence drafts was the duty of all justices in their individual
 performance of policy leadership exertion" (p. 33). Efforts to establish such
 policy leadership were widely dispersed, with the chief participating but never
 dominating and the associate justices - with the partial exception of the Court's
 two staunchest conservatives, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas - seeking
 personal influence through accommodation and compromise. The prominent
 role of that informal bargaining process, and the personal dynamics that marked
 the varied relations among the justices - especially Scalia' s "coalition-busting"
 behavior (p. 36) - prevented the formation of a cohesive and consistent conser-
 vative majority and thereby created the institutional conditions that allowed
 O'Connor to move into her central and often decisive position.
 Chapter two examines the "emerging predominance of separate, concurring
 opinions," a development that Maveety terms "multivocality" and identifies
 as the defining characteristic of a new kind of "choral Court." The expanded
 use of concurrences, and the increased number of justices who joined them,
 "enhanced the authority of individual justices to promulgate doctrine" and
This content downloaded from 208.67.210.24 on Wed, 05 Dec 2018 15:06:40 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 442 REVIEWS IN AMERICAN HISTORY / SEPTEMBER 2009
 reflected the Court's animating "judicial individualism" (p. 40). In institutional-
 izing the new "choral Court/7 Maveety maintains, O'Connor's behavior was
 critical. She "established that concurrence could be constitutively important"
 in determining the law (as her separate opinions addressing abortion and
 the Establishment Clause surely demonstrated), and she helped establish the
 legitimacy of the concurrence in the Court's institutional norms and practices.
 The emergence of a "choral Court," Maveety declares, was "potentially the
 most significant of any legacy - doctrinal or behavioral - the Rehnquist Court
 leaves" (p. 38).
 Chapter three turns to the Court's substantive jurisprudence, focusing
 closely on thirteen of the "most important" cases the Rehnquist Court decided,
 a plausible if inevitably debatable selection.3 Examining those cases, Maveety
 highlights O'Connor's role in establishing the "Rehnquist Court's 'supremely
 individualist' conception of judicial power" (p. 61). That judicial individualism
 led to a distinctive and pluralistic "associates' justice," a "case-fact-sensitive
 jurisprudential pragmatism that occurred as individual associate justices vied
 for influence from the center and with one another." Its ultimate result - given
 the Court's "lack of an overarching ideological unity" - was a jurisprudence of
 "contextual-factor, reasonableness-based balancing," (p. 61) a "rule-of- thumb
 doctrinal approach" that "became the predominant judicial methodology of
 a majority of the Rehnquist associates" (p. 102). The approach was rooted in
 "a judicial procedural commitment to the idea of the Court as a set of justices
 determined to record their various individual views, yet cooperative enough to
 accede reciprocity in doing so." Those characteristics composed the "O'Connor
 Court made manifest" (p. 103).
 Chapters four and five shift the book's focus to a consideration of the ways
 in which the Rehnquist Court led commentators to question and revise their
 views about the Court and its proper role. Bypassing some of the more obvious
 changes, Maveety zeroes in on the creation of a "judicial mythology" about
 O'Connor and her jurisprudence (p. 125). Increasingly pictured as restrained,
 moderate, and minimalist, O'Connor became "the contemporary gold standard
 for a judge" (p. 126). Although the two chapters are relatively thin in their
 analysis of the many debates the Rehnquist Court inspired, they nonetheless
 make the fair point that many commentators shaped their interpretations of
 O'Connor and her jurisprudence far more in the hope of controlling the future
 of the Court than in any effort to understand her actual judicial behavior and
 significance. Rejecting the O'Connor "mythology," Maveety argues that the
 justice was in fact a major force shaping the Rehnquist Court's expansive
 and insistent "juricentrism." The Court's restless, assertive, and rightward
 pressing judicial activism was "essentially indistinguishable from O'Connorist
 jurisprudence, except perhaps in terms of tone" (p. 115). O'Connor's true
 legacy, Maveety declares, was a demonstration not of the virtues of judicial
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 restraint but of "the power that lies in judicial pragmatism" (p. 12). Indeed,
 she suggests, "the real legacy of O'Connor-style jurisprudence is arrogance
 cloaked as humility" (p. 9).
 Thus, Maveety indicts the judicial O'Connorism she identifies and places at
 center stage. Although the pragmatism and moderation of judicial O'Connorism
 seemed to make it widely acceptable to both scholars and the public, the au-
 thor explains, its particularistic and even ad hoc method - and the uncabined
 individualism it nourished - created profound institutional and doctrinal
 problems. One was the influence that it exerted on the federal judiciary as a
 whole, where it empowered lower court judges to go their own individual
 ways and fostered "a declining norm of consensus" (p. 149). Another was
 its de facto challenge to the idea of a "rule of law." As the lower courts were
 "handed doctrine difficult to understand and impossible to apply," they were
 compelled "to resort to O'Connoresque" techniques themselves (p. 149), thereby
 undermining the law's predictability, expanding areas of legal uncertainty,
 and spurring repeated litigations over essentially the same issues. A third
 problem, "the real detrimental impact of O'Connor-style judicial pragmatism,"
 was the fact that its ostensible "restraint" was "fundamentally dishonest."
 In reality, O'Connoresque jurisprudence did not minimize or limit judicial
 power but rather "extended judicial influence and policy discretion" (p. 154).
 While O'Connor and "her" Court hewed to a relatively moderate if rightward
 leaning path, her jurisprudence posed serious dangers for the future. "The
 balancing approaches and empowered pragmatic judicial pluralities easily can
 be put to work for more ambitious, less conciliatory accomplishments that are
 then, disconcertingly, rendered hard to criticize in terms of invalid juridical
 methods or ends. O'Connorism's wrapping dresses as it conceals the vagaries
 of judicial power" (p. 155).
 Thus, the "true risk" of judicial O'Connorism was its unprincipled subjectiv-
 ism, the abandonment of "any notion that legal principle governs or restrains
 judging" (p. 156). The "greatest danger and the most worrisome legacy of
 the 'model justice' as a judicial guide," Maveety warns, is that it "inures us
 to judicial power without frankly acknowledging it as such, and provides
 comfort and cover where none should exist for unaccountable and possibly
 unwarranted judicial decision making" (p. 155).
 In its ultimate conclusion, then, Queen's Court brings us face to face once
 again with the central and long-recognized intellectual challenge of modern
 American constitutionalism: the problem of judicial "subjectivity" and its re-
 lationship to fundamental ideas about constitutionalism and a "rule of law."
 Maveety's critique of O'Connoresque jurisprudence seems acute, and her
 skepticism about some of the correctives that have been suggested - judicial
 minimalism, bright-line doctrinalism, and "popular" constitutionalism - seems
 equally warranted. Not surprisingly, Queen's Court offers no prescription to
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 resolve the difficulty it underscores except, possibly, a faint and implicit sug-
 gestion that greater candor about judicial values and more determined efforts
 to articulate rules - however narrow - might impose some limits. Of course,
 such a suggestion - if, indeed, the author actually intends to offer it - seems
 unlikely to carry us far. Maveety can, however, hardly be blamed for failing
 to resolve such a fundamental problem, even if it is the central problem her
 book highlights.
 While its analysis of the Rehnquist Court's inner workings is insightful and
 its warning about the dangers of an ad hoc pragmatic constitutionalism is apt,
 Queen's Court is less satisfactory in its truncated and largely allusive treatment
 of the broader historical forces that led to the emergence of a "choral Court/'
 The author acknowledges that O'Connor consciously followed the footsteps
 of Justices John M. Harlan the younger and Lewis F. Powell in using concur-
 rences to shape and sometimes control the law, for example, but she does
 little to explore the more general and longer-term forces that have gradually
 reshaped the Court's institutional norms and fostered its new "multivocality"
 Throughout the nineteenth century and into the 1930s, unanimity rates in the
 Court's decisions were extremely high, often reaching 90 percent.4 Indeed,
 as late as the 1920s the justices exhibited a strong preference for unanimity
 and, in order to make Court decisions unanimous, frequently acquiesced in
 judgments they doubted or opposed.5 Thus, it was only in the years after the
 New Deal that the Court's decisions commonly became fragmented by sepa-
 rate individual opinions, increasingly concurrences as well as dissents, with
 both more recently coming in multiples.6 Many developments - including the
 spread of legal realist assumptions, the increasingly heterogeneous nature of
 American society, and the appearance of new and especially divisive social
 and moral issues on the Court's docket - contributed to the fragmentation.
 Queen's Court recognizes the importance of such broader historical forces, but
 it consigns them to the periphery of its analysis. Instead, consistent with its
 narrow contemporary and institutional focus, it stresses the personal qualities
 of the sitting justices: O'Connor's combination of pragmatism and moderation,
 Stephen Breyer's ingrained problem-solving orientation, John Paul Stevens's
 faith in the value of honestly stated differences, the relative unwillingness
 of Scalia and Thomas to bargain, and the inability of the chief "to wield the
 power of his realm" (p. 151).
 Similarly, largely assuming rather than examining the substantive value
 conflicts that divided the Rehnquist justices, Queen's Court tends to obscure
 the jurisprudential problem obverse to the one it identifies. If O'Connoresque
 pragmatism has its dangers, so too do ostensibly "principled" approaches that
 are, in fact, generated and contoured by the demands of political ideology. A
 sweeping textualism or originalism that purports to provide "objective" or
 "correct" answers to contemporary legal problems, for example, may threaten
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 American constitutionalism as much as does the pragmatism of judicial mod-
 erates. Given the dangers of such ideologically based " certainties/' it might
 be useful to reconsider Maveety's seemingly implicit suggestion that greater
 judicial candor about the role of personal values in decision making might
 make a useful, if necessarily limited, contribution to American constitutional
 jurisprudence.
 Ironically, given Maveety's concerns, Queen's Court also obscures another
 quality of judicial O'Connorism. Its pragmatic accommodationism, which may
 well undermine "rule of law" ideas, was in some part inspired by a desire to
 exhibit doctrinal continuity, reaffirm the role of precedent, and minimize the
 extent to which the values of Republican judicial appointees were reshaping the
 nation's constitutional law. Judicial O'Connorism, in other words, can also be
 seen as a determined effort to maintain the image of an objective constitutional
 "rule of law" in the face of political change and ideological pressure. Thus, its
 "true" nature seems somewhat more complex than Maveety suggests.
 Queen's Court is a thoughtful and illuminating book; and it accomplishes
 what it set out to do, exploring the ways in which the Rehnquist Court - and
 its most famous swing justice - shaped the Court's internal norms of judicial
 behavior. Maveety has identified important changes in the Court's norms
 and practices, thoughtfully challenged the claim that O'Connor represents
 a judicial "gold standard," and illuminated from a new perspective the fun-
 damental jurisprudential problem that lies at the heart of modern American
 constitutionalism.
 Edward A. Purcell, Jr., is Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor at New York
 Law School. His most recent book is Originalism, Federalism, and the American
 Constitutional Enterprise: A Historical Inquiry (2007).
 1. Edward Lazarus, Closed Chambers: The Rise, Fall, and Future of the Modern Supreme Court
 (1998), 515.
 2. Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court (2007), 48.
 3. The cases, in alphabetical order, are: Bush v. Gore, City of Boeme v. Flores, Clinton v. Jones,
 Dickerson v. U.S., Gratz/Grutter v. Bollinger, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Kelo v. City of New London,
 Lawrence v. Texas, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Shaw v. Reno, Texas v. Johnson, U.S. v. Lopez,
 and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.
 4. See, for example, John P. Kelsh, "The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States
 Supreme Court, 1790-1945," Washington University Law Quarterly 77 (1999): 137, 178.
 5. Robert Post, "The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal
 Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court," Minnesota Law Review 85 (2001): 1267,
 1331-45.
 6. See, for example, Thomas G. Walker, Lee Epstein, and William J. Dixon, "On the Myste-
 rious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court," Journal of Politics
 50 (1998): 361; Gregory A. Caldeira and Christopher J. W. Zorn, "Of Time and Consensual
 Norms in the Supreme Court," American Journal of Political Science 42 (1998): 874.
This content downloaded from 208.67.210.24 on Wed, 05 Dec 2018 15:06:40 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
